Why do speakers produce gestures? is study tests the hypothesis that gesture facilitates the conceptual planning of speaking, and in particular, gesture promotes thinking about perceptually present information. is view implies that, when gesture is prohibited, people should be less likely to speak about such information. We tested this prediction among children (N = 50) who solved and explained Piagetian conservation tasks. For one set of conservation tasks, all children were allowed to gesture. For a second set of tasks, some children were prohibited from gesturing by wearing a cloth mu . When children were prohibited from gesturing, they expressed more non-present information and less perceptually present information in their explanations than when allowed to gesture. us, gesture production appears to highlight or lend salience to perceptually present information. We argue that gesture helps speakers decide what to attend to and therefore what to say.
Why do speakers produce gestures? Many di erent answers to this puzzle have been proposed. Some investigators have focused on the e ects of speakers' gestures on listeners' comprehension (e.g., Beattie & Shovelton, 1999; Kendon, 1994) , whereas others have focused on how gestures function for speakers themselves (e.g., Kita, 2000; Krauss, 1998) . A complete answer to this puzzle will likely require consideration of both listener-oriented and speaker-oriented functions.
In the present work, we focus on speaker-oriented functions of gesture, and we o er a new perspective on the puzzle of why speakers gesture. We build on three bodies of prior research, one that focuses on the role of gesture in packaging spatial information into speech (e.g., Kita, 2000) , one that focuses on gestures as deriving from simulated actions (e.g., Hostetter & Alibali, 2008, in press) , and one that focuses on the gestures people use in problem solving, particularly in situations in which important aspects of the problems are presented visuo-spatially (e.g., Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986; Perry, Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988; Schwartz & Black, 1996) . Taken together, these bodies of literature suggest a new hypothesis about a possible function of gestures for speakers, namely, that gestures highlight perceptual-motor information, making it more highly activated, and consequently more likely to be integrated into conceptualization for speaking and thinking.
Gesture in problem explanations
Many previous studies have investigated the gestures speakers produce when explaining their problem solutions (e.g., Goldin-Meadow, Alibali, & Church, 1993) .
ere is evidence that such gestures reveal speakers' understanding of the tasks they are explaining (Alibali, Bassok, Solomon, Syc, & Goldin-Meadow, 1999 ; Garber, Alibali, & Goldin-Meadow, 1998) . For example, in a mathematical problemsolving task, Alibali et al. (1999) found that speakers who depicted a particular problem feature in gesture when describing a problem were particularly likely to use a strategy that relied on that feature when solving the problem.
Other studies have suggested that gestures index transition periods in the development of problem solving. For example, Alibali and Goldin-Meadow (1993) found that children who gestured while explaining problems on a pretest learned more from a brief lesson than children who did not gesture. Other studies have shown that discrepancies between gesture and speech in children's task explanations are associated with readiness to learn. For example, Church and GoldinMeadow (1986) found that children who frequently produced gestures that "mismatched" their speech were especially likely to learn from a brief lesson about Piagetian conservation. Similar ndings have also been reported in several studies of children's understanding of equations (e.g., Perry et al., 1988; Singer & GoldinMeadow, 2005) .
A few recent studies have experimentally manipulated gesture and documented e ects on learning outcomes. Cook, Mitchell and Goldin-Meadow (2007) found that children who were required to gesture as they learned a mathematical concept retained their new knowledge better than children who were not required to gesture. Along similar lines, Broaders and colleagues found that children who were required to gesture during explanations of math problems were later more receptive to instruction about the problems than children who were not required to gesture (Broaders, Cook, Mitchell, & Goldin-Meadow, 2007) . Other research has examined the e ects of preventing speakers from gesturing. Chu and Kita (2008) found that adults who were prohibited from gesturing in a mental rotation task were less likely to progress to a more e cient problem-solving strategy than those who were free to gesture. us, there is extensive evidence, rst, that the gestures speakers produce during problem explanations re ect aspects of their knowledge about the task being explained, and second, that gestures are implicated in knowledge change in important ways. Why might this be the case? Past research supports the view that gesture is an integral part of the process of thinking. However, the mechanisms by which gesture plays a role in thinking are largely unspeci ed. In this paper, we consider a possible mechanism. We propose that gesture serves to highlight a particular type of information, namely, perceptual-motor information, which is very likely to be expressed in gestures.
Gesture as simulated action
Any claims made about the role of gesture in problem solving or learning situations must be compatible with arguments about the cognitive processes that give rise to gestures. Mounting evidence suggests that language processing involves simulations of actions and perceptual states (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Pulvermueller, 2005; Spivey, Richardson, & Gonzales-Marquez, 2005) , and recent theoretical work suggests that gestures derive from these simulations (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) . According to Hostetter and Alibali (2008) , speakers sometimes incompletely inhibit the motor activation that results from simulated actions, and when activation exceeds a set threshold, speakers produce gestures. As predicted by this framework, when speakers more strongly activate action simulations, they gesture at a higher rate (Hostetter & Alibali, 2010) , us, this account of the cognitive underpinnings of gestures is gaining empirical support.
Building on this view, we suggest here that the action of producing gestures, in turn, can feed back to raise the level of activation of simulated actions and perceptual states. In this way, gestures could highlight the information they express for speakers themselves. Because speakers who produce gestures have more strongly activated action simulations, they may focus more on information derived from such simulations, so they may traverse a di erent path in learning or problem solving than do speakers who do not gesture. In this way, producing gestures could in uence the course of learning and problem solving.
How gestures function for speakers
Claims made about the role of gesture in learning and problem solving must also be compatible with what is known about how gesture functions in the process of speaking. ere is wide agreement that gesture plays a functional role in speaking (e.g., Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 1992) ; however, there is not agreement about precisely how or at what point in the process gesture plays a role. Various hypotheses have been put forward as to the exact locus of the link between speech and gesture production processes. One school of thought holds that gestures are involved in generating the surface forms of utterances, speci cally, accessing items from the mental lexicon (e.g., Butterworth & Hadar, 1989; Krauss, Chen, & Chawla, 1996; Rauscher, Krauss, & Chen, 1996) . Gestures are thought to serve as a "cross-modal prime" that activates lexical items.
An alternative view holds that gesture plays a role at an earlier point in the process of speech production, namely, in the conceptual planning of speaking.
ere are two variations of this view. Some investigators have proposed that gesture plays a role in activating or maintaining mental imagery (de Ruiter, 1998; Morsella & Krauss, 2004; Wesp, Hess, Keutmann, & Wheaton, 2001 ). 1 Others have proposed that gesture serves to facilitate the packaging of spatial-motor information into verbalizable units (e.g., Alibali, Kita, & Young, 2000; Hostetter, Alibali, & Kita, 2007; Kita, 2000; Kita & Davies, 2009; Melinger & Kita, 2007) . is latter account rests on the fact that gestures o en represent aspects of action simulations, such as information about the physical properties of objects, about how bodies interact with objects, and about how objects interact with one another. For example, when describing a cup, gestures may indicate or represent physical aspects of the cup (such as its size, shape, or height) or information about how the speaker's body could interact with the cup (such as by picking it up, holding it, or tilting it). According to Kita (2000) , speakers use such gestures to explore alternative ways of organizing spatial-motor information. Gesture production helps speakers to arrive at a felicitous way of expressing such information in linear, verbal form. In this way, gesture is involved in the conceptual planning of utterances.
E ects of gesture prohibition
If gesture is involved in the conceptual planning of speaking, it seems possible that it may play a role in conceptualization more generally. As noted above, some recent experimental work supports this contention. In the present study, we use an experimental design to examine how gesture a ects thinking and speaking in a problem explanation task. Speci cally, we examined whether prohibiting speakers from gesturing in uences the nature of the information they express. If, as we have suggested, gesture highlights perceptual-motor information by raising the level of activation of simulated actions and perceptual states, then speakers should express more perceptual-motor information when they are allowed to gesture, than when they are prohibited from gesturing.
Past studies in which speakers have been prohibited from gesturing have shown that gesture prohibition does indeed a ect speech production. However, most previous studies of this issue have focused on the e ects of gesture prohibition on the uency of speech, rather than the content of speech. For example, Graham and Heywood (1976) found that speakers paused more when they were prohibited from gesturing while describing geometric shapes. Rauscher, Krauss, and Chen (1996) reported a similar phenomenon in participants who narrated an animated cartoon that they had just viewed. When gesture was prohibited, narrators spoke more slowly and produced more dys uencies. However, this e ect was found only in utterances that included spatial prepositions.
Two other studies investigated the e ect of gesture prohibition on resolution of tip-of-the-tongue states, with mixed results (Beattie & Coughlan, 1999; Frick-Horbury & Guttentag, 1998) . In these studies, participants were asked to retrieve a low frequency word on the basis of a verbal de nition (Brown & McNeill, 1966) . FrickHorbury and Guttentag (1998) found that participants successfully retrieved more words when gesture was allowed than when gesture was prohibited; however, Beattie and Coughlan (1999) obtained a non-signi cant but reverse pattern of results.
One study has provided suggestive evidence that gesture prohibition can a ect the content of speech (Rimè, Shiaratura, Hupet, & Ghysselinckx, 1984) . Speakers were asked to converse freely on a set of given themes, and the imagery level of the speech was assessed using a "computer program of content analysis conceived to quantify the degree of speech imagery" (p. 317). When gestures were prohibited, speakers received lower imagery scores. At face value, this nding seems to support the view that gesture production promotes a focus on perceptual-motor information. However, Rimé and colleagues provided little information about the workings of their content analysis program, so it is di cult to evaluate their claim.
Two studies have investigated the e ect of gesture prohibition on a memory task (Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001; Wagner, Nusbaum, & Goldin-Meadow, 2004) . In both studies, participants rst memorized a list of words or digits or a visual pattern, and then they solved and explained a math problem. A er the explanation, they were asked to recall the words, digits or visual pattern. eir recall performance was better when they were allowed to gesture during the explanation then when they were prohibited from gesturing. ese ndings indicate that the e ect of gesturing goes beyond speech production in a narrow sense, supporting the possibility that gesturing may a ect conceptual processes associated with speaking.
In the present study, we sought to test whether prohibiting speakers from gesturing would cause them to shi their focus away from information that is likely to be expressed in gesture, namely, perceptual-motor information. To do so, we utilized a task in which speakers could choose to focus on either information that is perceptually present or information that is not perceptually present: Piagetian conservation. In conservation tasks, children are asked to judge whether or not two identical quantities (e.g., two rows of six checkers each) are the same or different following a transformation (e.g., one row is spread apart), and to explain that judgment. In explaining such tasks, children o en focus on attributes of the task objects that are perceptually available (e.g., the length or density of the row of checkers). However, they also sometimes o en focus on non-perceptual aspects of the task (e.g., the identity of the quantities prior to the transformation) or on aspects of the task that are not perceptually available at the time when the explanation is elicited (e.g., the transformation that was performed before the question was posed). us, conservation is an ideal task with which to examine whether gesture prohibition leads to a shi in the nature of the information that children focus on. Past work has shown that children's gestured responses to conservation tasks o en express perceptually present information (Mainela-Arnold, Evans, & Alibali, 2006) . Based on this prior work, we hypothesized that when allowed to gesture, children would be especially likely to focus on perceptually present information, which is a type of perceptual-motor information that they commonly express in gesture in conservation explanations.
We examined the e ects of gesture prohibition using a within-subject design, in order to control for individual variation in gesture production. Children in the experimental group performed one set of conservation tasks with gesture allowed, and then performed a second set with gesture prohibited. eir performance was evaluated against that of children in a control group who performed both sets of conservation tasks with gesture allowed.
Method

Participants
Fi y students from two urban parochial schools participated in the study. e sample was predominantly Caucasian and middle class, and included 25 rstgrade students (12 boys, 13 girls) and 25 second-grade students (13 boys, 12 girls).
e children ranged in age from 5 years, 6 months to 7 years, 6 months (M = 6 years, 5 months).
Procedure
Each child was asked to solve six Piagetian conservation tasks, administered in two sets of three tasks each. Each set of three tasks included one liquid quantity task, one number task, and one length task. e liquid quantity tasks were conducted using containers of water, the number tasks using rows of plastic Duplo blocks or buttons, and the length tasks using Tinkertoy rods or wooden dowels. In each task, the objects were positioned such that one of them (i.e., one glass, row of blocks, or rod) was closer to the experimenter, and one was closer to the child.
In each task, children were rst asked to verify that the two task objects (e.g., two glasses of water, two rows of blocks, or two rods) had the same quantity (amount, number or length). One object was then transformed (e.g., a glass of water poured into a short, wide dish, a row of blocks spread apart, or a rod moved to the right). Children were then asked to judge whether the quantities were the same or di erent, and to explain that judgment.
For the rst set of three tasks, all children were allowed to gesture as they explained their judgments, and as expected, children gestured on a large majority of the trials (83%). For the second set of three tasks, children were randomly assigned to either a gesture-allowed or a gesture-prohibited condition. Children were prohibited from gesturing by placing their hands inside a furry cloth mu .
is manipulation was e ective at reducing gesture production. However, it did not eliminate gesture entirely. Some children occasionally used their mu ed hands to indicate or characterize the objects, and some children occasionally tilted their heads or used their elbows to indicate the objects.
Coding children's verbal explanations
We identi ed two types of explanations in children's responses. e rst focused on the present state of the task objects (e.g., "this one is tall and this one is short"), henceforth perceptually present explanations. Any response that included information about perceptual characteristics of the objects at the moment of explanation was classi ed as including a perceptually present explanation. 2 e second type of explanation focused on information that was not perceptually present at the moment of explanation, henceforth non-present explanations.
ere were three subcategories of non-present explanations. Prior state explanations focused on the prior state of the objects, either directly ("they were the same length before") or indirectly ("it's still the same water"). Hypothetical explanations focused on possible states of a airs ("if you put these two together, then this will be longer than this") or on general rules ("when you have a fatter glass, the water gets lower"). Transformation explanations focused on the particular transformation that the experimenter had just performed (e.g., "you moved it over") or on a possible transformation that she did not perform (e.g., "you didn't add any"). Any response that was identi ed as including prior state, hypothetical, or transformation reasoning was classi ed as including a non-present explanation.
It is important to note that individual responses o en included multiple explanations, so a single response could include both perceptually present and nonperceptual explanations. For example, in response to one of the length tasks, one child said, "Because, that one's shorter and that one's longer. Because you moved this over and this one stayed there. " Also, some responses included neither perceptually present nor non-perceptual explanations. For example, children sometimes said "I don't know" or "I just looked at them" and they sometimes stated that they counted the objects on the number trials.
Coding children's gestured explanations
Gestures were de ned as movements of the hands or arms that were produced in the act of speaking. Children's gestured explanations for the conservation tasks were segmented into individual gestures, transcribed, and assigned meanings using procedures described in prior work (Alibali et al., 2000; Church & GoldinMeadow, 1986; Evans, Alibali, & McNeil, 2001) , and summarized in the Appendix to this paper. e coding procedure involved describing the handshape, placement, and motion of the hands, and using these features to infer the meaning of the gesture.
Each individual gesture was then classi ed as to whether or not it incorporated deictic information. A gesture that incorporates deictic information can be either an iconic gesture that is performed towards one of the task objects (e.g., a at hand, palm down, produced at the top edge of the tall glass) or a purely deictic gesture that simply indicates one of the task objects (e.g., an index nger point toward the tall glass).
Each individual gesture was further coded into one of four categories based on the meaning of the gesture: (a) gestures that express solely deictic information (i.e., they simply indicated the task objects, and did not convey perceptual or action information), (b) gestures that conveyed perceptual information (i.e., information about features of the task objects, such as height, width, density, and so forth), (c) gestures that conveyed information about action (i.e., actions that were or could be performed on the task objects, such as pouring water, moving a rod, taking blocks away), or (d) gestures that did not fall into one of the previous categories (i.e., beat gestures, which are small bi-phasic hand movements that are hypothesized to serve a discourse structuring function (McNeill, 1992) ).
Reliability
To establish reliability, a second trained coder recoded a subset of 60 responses (20% of the total dataset). For verbal explanations, agreement between coders was 93% for identifying perceptually present explanations, 97% for identifying prior state explanations, 98% for identifying hypothetical explanations, and 96% for identifying transformation explanations. For gestured explanations, agreement between coders was 87% for identifying individual gestures from the stream of manual behavior, 95% for identifying whether or not gestures incorporated deictic information, and 81% for classifying gestures into the four meaning-based categories.
Results
e mu manipulation was e ective at reducing gesture frequency, as seen in Table 1 ; however, participants continued to produce some gestures even while wearing the mu . As seen in the table, most gestures produced while wearing the mu conveyed exclusively deictic information (i.e., they simply indicated one of the task objects). Most gestures produced while not wearing the mu conveyed perceptual information about the task objects, and also incorporated deictic information (i.e., is category includes both gestures that express solely perceptual information (i.e., produced in neutral space), and gestures that express both deictic and perceptual information (i.e., produced on the task objects). c is category includes both gestures that express solely action information (i.e., produced in neutral space), and gestures that express both deictic and action information (i.e., produced on or over the task objects). ** p < .001, comparing Experimental to Control * p < .05, comparing Experimental to Control gestures toward one of the task objects that also depicted a feature of the object, such as a at palm held at the level of the water).
Participants' verbal explanations were analyzed using 2 (set: one vs. two) x 2 (condition: allowed-allowed vs. allowed-prohibited) repeated measures ANOVA, with set as a within-subjects factor and condition as a between-subjects factor. We used two di erent dependent measures: (1) number of responses that included perceptually present explanations, and (2) number of responses that included nonpresent explanations. Because there were 3 tasks in each set, participants' scores for each of these dependent measures for each set ranged from 0 to 3. Responses that included both types of explanations were counted in both categories. Because individual responses could include both types of explanations, the two measures are independent. Note that, because the experimental manipulation took place during the second set of tasks, an e ect of gesture prohibition would be revealed in these analyses as an interaction of condition and set.
As seen in Figure 1 , children produced more responses with perceptually present explanations when they were allowed to gesture, yielding the predicted signi cant interaction between condition and set, F(1, 48) = 8.68, η 2 = .15, p = .005. Focusing on set two, where the experimental manipulation occurred, a planned comparison indicated that children who were allowed to gesture produced signicantly more responses with perceptually present explanations than did children who were prohibited from gesturing, F(1, 48) = 9.17, η 2 = .16, p = .004. us, when gesture was allowed, children were more likely to focus on the current perceptual state of the task objects. is general pattern held for each of the three quantities. In set two, perceptually present explanations were given, for liquid quantity, by 92% of children in the gesture-allowed group and 73% of children in the gestureprohibited group; for length, by 67% of children in the gesture-allowed group and 39% of children in the gesture-prohibited group; and for number, by 50% of children in the gesture-allowed group and 42% of children in the gesture-prohibited group.
As seen in Figure 2 , children produced more responses with non-present explanations when they were prohibited from gesturing, yielding the predicted interaction between condition and set, F(1, 48) = 6.26, η 2 = .11, p = .016. Focusing on set two, where the experimental manipulation occurred, a planned comparison indicated that children who were prohibited from gesturing produced signi cantly more responses with non-present explanations than children who were allowed to gesture, F(1, 48) = 15.93, η 2 = .28, p = .002. us, when gesture was prohibited, children were more likely to refer to information that was not in front of them.
is general pattern also held for each of the three quantities. In set two, nonpresent explanations were given, for liquid quantity, by 12% of children in the gesture-allowed group and 30% of children in the gesture-prohibited group; for length, by 23% of children in the gesture-allowed group and 68% of children in the gesture-prohibited group; and for number, 46% of children in the gesture-allowed group and 54% of children in the gesture-prohibited group.
We next examined whether this pattern held for each of the three subtypes of non-present explanations. A large majority of non-present explanations were of the transformation subtype. Limiting the analysis to transformation explanations only, we found that children produced more transformation explanations when they were prohibited from gesturing, yielding a marginally signi cant interaction between condition and set, F(1, 48) = 3.27, η 2 = .06, p = .08. A planned comparison at set two indicated that children who were prohibited from gesturing produced signi cantly more responses with transformation explanations than children who were allowed to gesture, F(1, 48) = 13.38, η 2 = .25, p < .001.
Prior state and hypothetical explanations were much less common in the dataset overall than were transformation explanations, and they were too few to analyze statistically. To evaluate changes in these types of explanations, we identied children who did not use such explanations on the rst set of tasks, and then calculated the proportion of these children who used such explanations on the second set. For prior-state explanations, among children who did not use such explanations on set one, 20% of children in the gesture-prohibited group at set two generated prior-state explanations, whereas only 6% of children in the gestureallowed group generated such explanations. For hypothetical explanations, among children who did not produce such explanations on set one, 14% of children in the gesture-prohibited group at set two generated hypothetical explanations, whereas 8% of children in the gesture-allowed group generated such explanations. us, more children who were prohibited from gesturing generated both prior-state and hypothetical explanations.
Potential issues and alternative explanations
One potential problem with the interpretation we have proposed is the fact that the mu manipulation did not eliminate gestures altogether. As noted above, children sometimes produced gestures with their hands in the mu . It is possible that the gestures that children produced while wearing the mu were somehow especially likely to activate or encourage non-present explanations. If this were the case, the results would require a substantially di erent interpretation from the one we have proposed. To address this possibility, we eliminated all of the trials in which children gestured with the mu from the dataset, and reanalyzed the data. Seven children who were prohibited from gesturing at set two were excluded from this analysis because they produced gestures on all three of the gesture-prohibited trials (e.g., by moving the mu or by moving their elbows).
e outcome was identical to that observed with the full dataset. Children produced more responses with perceptually present explanations when they were allowed to gesture (M = .69 vs. M = .43), yielding a signi cant interaction between condition and set, F(1, 41) = 6.61, η 2 = .14, p = .01. Focusing only on set two, where the experimental manipulation occurred, a planned comparison indicated that children who were allowed to gesture produced signi cantly more perceptually present explanations than children who were prohibited from gesturing, F(1, 41) = 11.62, η 2 = .24, p = .002. Further, children produced more responses with non-present explanations when they were prohibited from gesturing (and did not gesture) (M = .48 vs. M = .28), F(1, 41) = 3.28, η 2 = .07, p = .08. Focusing only on set two, children who were prohibited from gesturing produced signi cantly more responses with non-present explanations than children who were allowed to gesture, F(1, 41) = 8.31, η 2 = .18, p = .006. us, there was no evidence that the results depended on the types of gestures that children could produce while wearing the mu .
Another possible alternative explanation for our ndings is that children chose the type of explanation that they found easier to express in each context. Non-present information may be easier to express without gesture than perceptually present information, so participants may have shi ed to non-present explanations when gesture was prohibited. One way to assess this possibility is to examine how o en children spontaneously gestured in responses that included only perceptually present explanations vs. only non-present explanations, when gesture was allowed (i.e., in set 1). If there were no di erences in gesture frequency for the two types of explanations when gesture was allowed, this would undermine this explanation. Because there are large individual di erences in gesture rates , we limited this analysis to individuals who produced explanations in both categories in set 1 (N = 12). Indeed, the mean number of gestures per response did not di er signi cantly between perceptually present responses (M = 2.21, SD = 1.33) and non-present responses (M = 2.28, SD = 1.99), t(11) = .41, d = .12, p = .69. us, there was no evidence that the results were due to the two types of responses being di erentially easy to express without gestures.
Another possible alternative explanation for our ndings is that when gesture is prohibited, speakers may shi or "translate" information that they had previously expressed uniquely in gestures into speech. If this were the case, the results would also require a di erent interpretation from the one we have proposed. In addressing this issue, we focused on trials in which children expressed information about action uniquely in gesture, because children in the gesture-prohibited condition tended to express transformation information in speech when gesture was prohibited. us, we identi ed all trials in set one in which children expressed information about action uniquely in gesture (N = 8), and we examined whether children expressed transformation information in speech in the corresponding trials in set two in which gestures were prohibited. In not one of these eight cases did the children express transformation information in speech at set two. us, there was no evidence that the results were due to children expressing action information uniquely in gesture when gesture was allowed, and "translating" or shi ing that information into speech when gesture was prohibited.
Relation to knowledge of conservation
Finally, we examined whether the pattern varied as a function of children's status as non-conservers, partial conservers, or full conservers at set one. Children were classi ed as non-conservers if they judged the quantities as di erent a er the transformation for all three tasks in set one. Children were classi ed as full conservers if they judged the quantities as the same a er the transformation for all three tasks in set one. Children were classi ed as partial conservers if they judged the quantities as the same a er the transformation for one or two of the tasks at set one.
For all of the conservation knowledge subgroups, children who were prohibited from gesturing made greater decreases in perceptually present responses (Table 2) from set one to set two than did children who were allowed to gesture. is pattern was signi cant for the non-conservers, F(1, 24) = 8.38, η 2 = .26, p = .008, but did not reach signi cance for the partial conservers, F(1, 15) = 2.13, η 2 = .12, p = .17. ere were very few full conservers (three who were allowed to gesture and four who were prohibited from gesturing), so the pattern could not be analyzed statistically.
In addition, for both non-conservers and partial conservers, children who were prohibited from gesturing made greater increases in non-present responses (Table 3 ) from set one to set two than did children who were allowed to gesture, F(1, 24) = 9.95, η 2 = .21, p = .004 for non-conservers, and F(1, 15) = 4.64, η 2 = .23, p = .048 for partial conservers. Among the full conservers, children in both conditions produced fewer such responses at set two.
Based on the foregoing analyses, it is apparent that gesture prohibition led to increased expression of non-present information. Given that many correct (conserving) explanations focus on non-present information (e.g., the initial Table 2 equality of the quantities, the fact that nothing was added or taken away), it was natural to consider whether the increase in non-present explanations was accompanied by an increase in correct (same) judgements in the conservation tasks. Overall, children provided slightly more same judgements in set two (M = 1.14, SE = 0.17) than in set one (M = 0.96, SE = 0.16); however, this increase did not vary by condition. us, children who were prohibited from gesturing altered their verbal explanations in set two without substantially altering their conservation judgements. It should be noted, however, that the design of this study may not have been sensitive enough to reveal a change in judgements. If explanation under gesture prohibition in uences conservation judgements, then this e ect should appear only a er the rst trial with gesture prohibition. is leaves only two trials in the second set in which conservation judgements could potentially have been in uenced by gesture prohibition.
Discussion
In explaining Piagetian conservation tasks, children were more likely to focus on information that was not perceptually present when gesture was prohibited, and more likely to focus on information that was perceptually present when gesture was allowed. ese ndings suggest that producing gestures makes perceptually present information more highly activated and more likely to be expressed in children's problem explanations. In this way, gesture is involved in the conceptual planning of speaking, and perhaps in conceptualization more generally. Note. Non-present explanations include prior state, transformation, and hypothetical subtypes. e maximum number possible per set was 3.
Are the present ndings compatible with the idea that gestures derive from simulated actions (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) ? At rst glance, the ndings seem more speci c to perception than to action, because explanations that focused on the action the experimenter performed (e.g., pouring the water) were categorized as non-present responses in our coding scheme. In putting these pieces together, it is essential to consider the reciprocal relations between perception and action (e.g., Dewey, 1896; Gibson, 1979) . We move our bodies (e.g., our eyes, heads, and hands) in order to perceive (e.g., Campos et al., 2000; O'Regan & Noë, 2001 ), and we perceive in order to guide our actions. For example, when we perceive objects, we automatically activate actions that we might use in manipulating or interacting with those objects (Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998) . From this perspective, it is sensible that explanations that invoke perceptually present information involve simulated actions, which may evoke gesture production, and which may also become more highly activated as a result of gestural actions. us, the ndings are indeed compatible with the idea that gestures derive from simulated actions.
Moreover, the current results suggest that gestures may actually in uence the nature of people's simulations. In the present study, children were asked make inferences about objects that were physically present in front of them. Kita (2000) has argued that gestures are used to explore and highlight aspects of objects (simulated or real). In the present study, the "a ordances" of the objects may have guided children's gestures, and these gestural actions in turn highlighted perceptual features of the objects in children's conceptualization, leading to a higher frequency of perceptually present explanations.
Indeed, gestures to perceptual features of the physically present task objects (e.g., deictic and iconic gestures that indicate their heights, water levels, endpoints, density, and so forth) may actually be an integral part of perceiving those features. If this is the case, such gestures should be especially likely to feed activation to those features, highlighting them for speakers' conceptualization of the task. From this perspective, it makes sense that, in this task involving physically present task objects, the availability of gesture promoted a focus on perceptually present information.
In contrast, when gestures were prohibited, the perceptually present situation was not highlighted by gesture, making other information about the task relatively more salient. When gesture was prohibited, children were less "bound" to the objects in front of them, and they were free to activate other sorts of information, such as information about how the objects looked before, how the objects were transformed by the experimenter, and how the objects could hypothetically be transformed. is led to a higher frequency of non-present explanations. 3 An alternative, but related explanation can be given on the basis of the recent development of the Growth Point eory of speech-gesture production, in which gesture is considered to be a "material carrier" of thinking (McNeill, 2005; McNeill & Duncan, 2000) . According to this view, gestures do not merely encode prepackaged meaning, but producing a gesture can alter the status of the information encoded in the gesture: "[T]o make a gesture … is to bring thought into existence on a concrete plane, just as writing out a word can have a similar e ect" (McNeill & Duncan, 2000, p. 156) . When children gesture about perceptually present features of the task objects, these features become "concrete". is presumably means that the features become something more than physical parameters that guide motor control, namely, something accessible by other cognitive processes, such as verbal thought. Consequently, the features expressed in children's gestures are more likely to be incorporated into their verbal explanations. When gesture is prohibited, perceptually present features of the objects are highlighted less, and other types of information are more likely to be incorporated into the explanations.
Relation to other views about the function of gesture
Our account of the e ects of gesture production di ers from the one proposed by Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly and Wagner (2001) and Wagner, Nusbaum and Goldin-Meadow (2004) , who also used a gesture-prohibition paradigm to investigate the function of gesture. However, these researchers did not focus on the speech that individuals produced under gesture prohibition. Instead, they focused on memory performance, and found that speakers performed better on various memory tasks when they were allowed to gesture. ey interpreted these ndings as showing that gesture o -loads working memory, freeing up capacity for a secondary task -as they put it, gesture "lightens the load" of explanation.
Although our approach was quite di erent from that of Goldin-Meadow and colleagues, our ndings are not necessarily incompatible with theirs. We found that speakers expressed di erent information when they were prohibited from gesturing. It is possible that speakers produced more resource-intensive explanations when gesture was allowed and they could use gesture to help manage capacity demands. When gesture was prohibited, they shi ed to more resource-lean explanations, which they could formulate and express even without gesture to assist them in managing memory demands. is explanation rests on the assumption that non-present explanations require fewer working memory resources than do explanations that focus on perceptually present information -a possibility that remains to be tested in future work.
Might our ndings be explained by the idea that gestures facilitate accessing words, especially those with spatial content (e.g., Butterworth & Hadar, 1989; Krauss et al., 1996; Rauscher et al., 1996) ? e explanation would be that gesture prohibition made it di cult to access spatial words necessary for perceptually present explanations, and thus the explanations shi ed to ones with words that were readily accessible without gestures. We do not nd this argument compelling, for two reasons. First, the spatial words used in perceptually present explanations were usually common words such as "big", "small", "tall", "short", "high", "low", which were presumably easy to access regardless of the availability of gestures. Second, most of non-present explanations included spatial words as well (e.g., "they were the same length before", "you moved it over", "when you have a fatter glass, the water gets lower"). us, it does not seem likely that gesture prohibition made it di cult to access the words needed for perceptually present explanations.
Our ndings are most compatible with the idea that gestures facilitate conceptual planning for speaking, by helping speakers to package information into verbalizable units (Alibali et al., 2000; Kita, 2000) . Gestures may help speakers to parse a complex array of information into small units and to select units of information for verbalization (Kita & Davies, 2009; Melinger & Kita, 2007) . Gestures highlight certain pieces of information -in the present study, perceptual features of the task objects. is information is then incorporated into conceptual planning for speaking, and eventually encoded in participants' verbal explanations.
Potential generalizability of the ndings
Should we expect the present ndings to generalize to other tasks or to other participant populations? At present, this remains an open question. It seems likely that the ndings would be speci c to tasks that draw on perceptual-motor thinking, such as conservation, or to tasks that elicit the types of gestures that are typically seen in conservation explanations -namely, deictic and iconic gestures that are directed toward relevant objects. Future studies will be needed to examine whether other types of gestures, in particular, those that are not directed toward objects, also serve to highlight perceptual information.
It is also an open question whether the ndings would generalize to adult participants. Given that adults have better attentional control and greater working memory capacity than children, it is possible that they may be less reliant on gesture to represent object features or to help construct resource-demanding explanations. However, given the close ties between gesture, perception, and simulated action, we suspect that gesture serves to highlight perceptual-motor information for adults well as children. erefore, we would expect a similar outcome on an adult-appropriate task with similar characteristics.
Implications for education
Do the present ndings have implications for learning and instruction? e answer seems to be "it depends". Because gesture production promotes a focus on perceptual-motor information, then to the extent that perceptual-motor information is useful in completing a task at hand, producing gestures should be bene cial for thinking and learning. However, if perceptual-motor information is misleading, as it is in conservation tasks, producing gestures may actually be detrimental to thinking and learning. In the present study, we did not nd bene cial e ects of gesture prohibition on children's conservation judgements; however, it could be argued that non-present explanations, and in particular, prior state explanations, are more sophisticated than perceptually present explanations. us, the evidence about whether gesture is detrimental to conservation reasoning is mixed.
e present ndings do not allow for a general statement about whether it would be valuable to elicit or encourage gestures in educational settings. A more nuanced consideration of the demands of each particular task, and of the pros and cons of activating perceptual vs. non-perceptual information for each task, will be required.
Conclusion
In sum, our main nding is clear -when speakers were prevented from gesturing, their explanations included perceptually present information less o en and nonpresent information more o en. ese ndings suggest that producing gestures highlights or lends salience to perceptual-motor information. We have argued that producing gestures feeds activation to simulated actions, and furthermore, producing gestures can in uence the content of action simulation. As a result, gestures contribute to thinking by helping speakers decide what to attend to and what to say.
Portions of these data were presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Minneapolis, Minnesota, April, 2001 , and at the Meeting of the Society for Orality and Gestuality (ORAGE), Aix-en-Provence, France, June 2001.
Notes
. Hadar, Burstein, Krauss, and Soroker (1998) propose a hybrid between the image-activation hypothesis and the lexical access hypothesis. ey argue that gestures activate visuo-spatial representations, which in turn activate concepts that underlie the sought-a er words. is extra activation of the underlying concepts facilitates access to the sought-a er words.
. Some responses described the present state of the task objects using a past participle construction. For example, on one of the number tasks, one child said, "Because these are all squished together. " Such explanations include perceptually present information (i.e., information about the density of one row) but do so in terms of the transformation, which was not perceptually present (i.e., "squishing"). In the analyses presented in this paper, we counted these responses in the perceptually present category; however, the ndings do not di er if they are excluded.
. Note that activating non-present information likely involves motor or visual imagery (e.g., of the transformation or of the initial state of the objects), and there is evidence that imagery involves simulated actions (e.g., Jeannerod, 2001; Shepard & Metzler, 1971; Wohlschlaeger & Wohlschlaeger, 1998) . However, it seems likely that mental imagery activates action simulations less strongly than direct perceptual experience of the objects.
research utilizes a variety of methods, including experimental studies, microgenetic studies that examine processes of knowledge change in intense detail, and classroom studies that examine learning and instructional communication in vivo.
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